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strictly to judicial standards, 17 but have to substantially comply with
the evidence. 18 The findings must be stated by the Board itself,' 9
and it may not delegate this duty to a trial examiner. 20 Though it
21
may treat his findings as a recommendation,
the Board may reverse
22
taken.
are
exceptions
them when no
B.F.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICEREFUSAL TO SIGN WRITTEN AGREEMENT AS A REFUSAL TO BARGAIN

COLLEcTIvELY.-In the campaign preceding an election by petitioner's
employees of an organization to represent them in collective bargaining, petitioner's supervising employees participated in behalf of the
Heinz Employees Associatiofi, a plant organization. Their activities
ranged from disparaging remarks about the outside union to threats of
discharge, if the union were recognized. Following a complaint by a
representative of the union, petitioner instructed the supervising employees to refrain from interfering in the campaign, and they did.
However, petitioner failed to notify its employees that it repudiated
the participation of its supervising employees in the organization of the
association, and so had not removed the belief of the employees that
petitioner would favor those joining the association, or that support of
the union would result in reprisals. Since the election, in which the
union was designated by a majority as their bargaining representative,
petitioner has consistently recognized and bargained with the union.
Although petitioner has reached an agreement with the union concerning wages, hours and working conditions of the employees, it has
refused to sign any contract embodying the terms of the agreement.
After a complaint by the union, the National Labor Relations Board
directed petitioner to cease the unfair labor practices in which petitioner had engaged in connection with the association, to disestablish
the association, to recognize and bargain collectively with the union,
and to sign a written contract embodying any agreement which .petitioner might reach respecting wages, hours and working conditions of
petitioner's employees. On certiorarito review a judgment' of the
27

1939).

International Ass'n of Mach. v. N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 587 (App. D. C.

Is N. L. R. B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, 59 Sup. Ct. 508 (1939);
N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 94 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938);
International Ass'n of Mach. v. N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 587 (App. D. C.
1939).
19
2 0 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (1935).
N . L. R. B. v. Elkland Leather Co., Inc., 114 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940).2
N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 94 F. (2d) 671 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938).
22 See note 21, supra.
2 110 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940).
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Circuit Court of Appeals directing the enforcement of the order of the
National Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court held, affirmed.
(1) An employer, who may benefit from unauthorized acts on the
part of supervisory employees, which constitute unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, is within the
reach of the Board's order to prevent any repetition of such activities
and to remove the consequences of them upon the employees' right of
self organization. (2) There is adequate basis for the Board's order
disestablishing the association, since there is evidence that the influence
of the participation of petitioner's employees in the organization of the
association had not been removed and that there was danger that petitioner would seek to take advantage of such continuing influence to
renew its recognition of the association and control its action. (3)
Petitioner's refusal to sign a written agreement is a refusal to bargain
collectively and an unfair labor practice. H. I. Heinz Company v.
National Labor Relations Board, - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct. 320 (1941).
The National Labor Relations Act 2 is a farreaching enactment
designed primarily to reduce strikes and other forms of industrial
strife and unrest 3 As the refusal of an employer to bargain with his
employees has so often led to just such disastrous consequences, 4 the
Act made it compulsory for the employer to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees 5 with the aim of reaching an
agreement. 6 Although the Act does not require that an agreement be
reached, 7 the employer must negotiate in good faith. The mere perfunctory acts of bargaining without an intent of reaching an agreement
will not suffice. 8 Difficult as is the enforcement of this requirement
249 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C A. § 151, et seq. (1935).
3 49 STAT.

449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1935).

4Ibid.
6549 STAT. 452, 29 U. S.C.A. §158(5) (1935).
See N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct.
615 (1937) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct.
206 (1938); N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. (2d) 632, 638
(C. C. A. 4th, 1940). "If reason and not force is to have sway in industrial
relationships, such agreements should be welcomed by capital as well as labor.
They not only provide standards by which industrial disputes may be adjusted,
but they add dignity to the position of labor and remove the feeling on the part
of the worker that he is a mere pawn in industry subject to the arbitrary power
of the employer."
7 See N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct.
615 (1937) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct.

206 (1938).

8 N. L. P- B. v. Griswold Manufacturing Co., 106 F. (2d) 713, 723 (C. C
A. 3d, 1939). "It is obvious that an employer who enters into negotiations with
a labor union representing his employees, with his mind hermetically sealed
against even the thought of entering into an agreement with the union, is guilty
of refusing to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees in
good faith, as required by the Act, and is therefore guilty of an unfair labor
practice. The studied and meticulous efforts of the respondent, in the course of
its negotiations with its employees, and in its relationship with its own dominated
union, to be 'within the law,' tell their own story. Duties imposed by law cannot
be discharged by offering shadow for substance."
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the Board encountered an almost unsurmountable obstacle where employers, after having reached an agreement, claimed the right to refuse
to commit the provisions thereof to a signed writing.a The National
Labor Relations Act does not specifically call for a signed agreement.
It is conceded that a stipulation in an oral contract that it be reduced
to writing is one of the terms of the agreement. ° Since the parties
here have not agreed that such a term be included and since the Act
does not require any agreement to be reached, petitioner argues that it
cannot be compelled to affix its signature to a writing it has never
agreed to sign." This interpretation of the National Labor Relations
Act ignores both its history 12 and its aims. 18 If it were followed, the
evils which the Act sought to eliminate would return scarcely abated,
for the purpose of the Act can be effectuated only where the signing of
the agreement is marndatory. 14 The refusal of an employer to sign a
collective bargaining agreement might well be considered as indicating
his lack of good faith. Such a refusal tends to discredit the union
and results in a failure to provide an authentic record of the agreement.1 r In short, the refusal of an employer to sign a collective bar9 Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 109 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; Art
Metals Construction Co. v. N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
N. L. R. B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940) ;
Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 111 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940); Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 114 F. (2d) 930
(C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Wilson & Co. v. N. L. R. B., 115 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A.
8th, 1940).
10 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 28.
11 Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 109 F. (2d) 9, 24 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940);
Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 111 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A.
7th, 1940).
12 See note 18, infra.
I3 See note 3, supra.
14 Art Metals Construction Co. v. N. L. R. B., 110 F. (2d) 148, 150
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940). "It is indeed true, and for that matter a truism, that a
stipulation in an oral contract that it shall be put into writing is one of its terms,
and that if an employer must put it in, he is not free pro tanto. But he is no
longer wholly free anyway; before the act he was not obliged to bargain with
his employees collectively; he was at liberty to refuse to negotiate with them at
all, or otherwise than severally. The act impaired that freedom; it meant to
give to the employees whatever advantage they would get from collective pressure upon their employer; and the question here is what are the fair implications
of that grant. They should include whatever is reasonably appropriate to
protect it, and no one can dispute that a permanent memorial of any negotiation
which results in a bargain, is not only appropriate, but practically necessary, to
its preservation; it is hardly necessary to observe that without it the fruits of
the privileze are exposed to the sport of fugitive and biased recollection. The
purpose of a contract is to define the promised performance, so that when it
becomes due, the parties may know the extent to which the promisor is bound;

and it is the merest casuistry to argue that the promisor's freedom to contract
includes the opportunity to put in jeopardy the ascertainment of what he has
agreed to do. or indeed whether he has agreed to do anything at all. The freedom reserved to the employer is the freedom to refuse concessions in working
conditions to his employees, and to exact concessions from them; it is not the
freedom, once they have in fact agreed unon those conditions, to compromise the
value of the whole proceeding and probably make it nugatory."
15 See note 14, supra.
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gaining agreement frustrates the aim of the statute to secure industrial
peace through collective bargaining.16 Administrative agencies dealing with labor relations before the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act had adopted the settled practice of treating the signing
of a written contract as the final step in the bargaining process.17
Congress, by incorporating in the National Labor Relations Act the
collective bargaining requirements of the earlier statutes,18 included as
a part thereof the signed agreement.' 9
B.B.

NEGLIGENCE-HOSPITALS-CIRCU MSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CONSTITUTING A PRIMA FAClE CAsE.-Plaintiffl was admitted to defendant

hospital one morning at 8:00 A. M. to undergo an operation. At
about 5:30 P. M., a hospital attendant hung an electric light lamp.
having a reflector on top of the bedstead at the foot of the bed. Plaintiff was taken to the operating room at about 8:00 P. M., and at that
time the lamp was still hanging on the end of the bed. For purposes
of the operation, he was given a spinal anesthetic which "deadened" his
body from about the middle thereof to the end of his feet. When one
hour later he was brought back to his room by two attendants, he was
put into bed and covered with a sheet and spread. At about midnight
plaintiff felt a burning sensation in his feet and complained to the
nurse who, upon lifting the bed clothes, found the electric light lamp.
His foot was severely burned, and he now seeks to recover damages
for his injury. Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to state a
prima facie case as it contains no proof (a) that the burn was caused
by the lamp and (b) that the lamp was placed in a position to burn his
foot as a result of the negligence of any person for whose act or omission defendant is liable. The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment
of the trial term dismissing the complaint. Held, reversed, and new
trial granted. Dillon v.Rockaway Beach Hospital& Dispensary,284
N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. (2d) 373 (1940).
A hospital, whether charitable or private, isimmune from liability
for the negligence of its doctors or nurses with respect to any matter
relating to a patient's medical care and attention.' This exemption
26 See notes 14, 15, supra.
17N. L. R. B. v.Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. (2d) 632, 638 (C. C. A.

4th, 1940).

IsSee note 17, supra.
19 See notes 14, 17, supra.
1 CLERK AND LINDSELL, TORTS

(9th ed.) 274 ("The law appears to be that

while a hospital authority may not be liable for medical treatment by doctors or
nurses, provided reasonable care has been exercised in their selection it will be
liable for any of their negligent acts or omissions not directly concerned with
medical treatment but in respect to which the doctors and nurses could be considered as servants-of the authority").

